

People v. Jennifer Reba Edwards. 21PDJ077. May 22, 2023.

Following a hearing on the sanctions, a hearing board disbarred Jennifer Reba Edwards (attorney registration number 38349; Edwards is also known as Jennifer Reba Emmi), effective July 19, 2023.

On June 28, 2021, Edwards pleaded guilty and was convicted in Jefferson County District Court of retaliation against a witness or victim, a class-three felony; stalking, a class-four felony; and solicitation to commit murder in the second degree, a class-three felony. Edwards received a ten-year sentence of imprisonment for each conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. Also on June 28, 2021, in a separate criminal case in Jefferson County District Court, Edwards pleaded guilty and was convicted of menacing, a class-five felony; second-degree assault—strangulation, a class-six felony; and two counts of child abuse—knowing/reckless—no injury, a second-degree misdemeanor. Edwards received a two-year sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently with her sentence in her other criminal case. In a third criminal matter in Jefferson County District Court, Edwards pleaded guilty and was convicted on June 28, 2021, of attempt to influence a public servant, a class-four felony, and violation of bail bond conditions, a class-six felony. Edwards was sentenced to four years of imprisonment to be served concurrently with her sentence in the first criminal matter.

Through this conduct, Edwards violated Colo. RPC 8.4(b) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects).

The case file is public per C.R.C.P. 242.41(a). Please see the full opinion below.

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE 1300 BROADWAY, SUITE 250 DENVER, CO 80203	
Complainant: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO	Case Number: 21PDJ077
Respondent: JENNIFER REBA EDWARDS, #38349 ¹	
OPINION IMPOSING SANCTIONS UNDER C.R.C.P. 242.31(a)	

Jennifer Reba Edwards (“Respondent”) pleaded guilty and was convicted of stalking, retaliation against a witness, menacing, child abuse, second-degree assault, attempt to influence a public servant, violation of bail bond conditions, and solicitation to commit murder. Because Respondent was convicted of serious crimes, her misconduct warrants disbarment.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 2, 2021, the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“the People”) filed a one-claim complaint in this matter with the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (“the Court”). When Respondent did not answer, the Court entered default in January 2022. The next month, the People notified the Court of new developments demonstrating that Respondent never received their motion for default. The Court therefore set aside entry of default and directed Respondent to answer the complaint. Respondent thereafter secured extensions of time to answer. On May 19, 2022, Gerald D. Pratt entered his appearance as Respondent’s counsel. Respondent answered the People’s complaint in June 2022. At a scheduling conference on July 7, 2022, the Court set this matter for a trial to take place on December 20-21, 2022.

On Respondent’s motion, the Court imposed an interim stay of the case under C.R.C.P. 242.28 on September 1, 2022. The Court lifted the stay on December 1, 2022. It then convened a remote status conference with the parties on December 20, 2022, and reset the trial date to March 8-9, 2023. Because Respondent is incarcerated, the parties and the Court agreed that the matter should proceed as a fully remote hearing via the Zoom videoconferencing platform.

¹ Respondent is also known as Jennifer Reba Emmi.

On January 13, 2023, the Court granted the People's motion for summary judgment and converted the disciplinary hearing to a remote hearing on the sanctions to take place on March 9, 2023. Respondent moved to continue the hearing in February 2023, but the Court denied that motion.

On March 9, 2023, a Hearing Board comprising Presiding Disciplinary Judge Bryon M. Large ("the PDJ") and lawyers Maureen A. Cain and Barbara Weil Laff convened a remote hearing on the sanctions via the Zoom videoconferencing platform. Gregory G. Sapakoff appeared for the People, and Pratt appeared for Respondent. Respondent also participated using a remote connection from the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women in Virginia, where she is incarcerated. During the remote hearing, the PDJ granted Respondent's renewed oral motion to continue the hearing to give her additional time to prepare with her counsel following her unexpected transfer in January 2023 to Fluvanna from the Denver Women's Correctional Facility. The PDJ continued the hearing on the sanctions in this case to March 31, 2023, to be held remotely via Zoom.

On March 31, 2023, the Hearing Board reconvened the hearing on the sanctions via Zoom. Sapakoff attended for the People, and Pratt represented Respondent, who also appeared using a remote connection from Fluvanna. The Hearing Board received testimony via Zoom from Respondent, Paul Murphy, Barbara Crist, and Jay Swearingen.² The PDJ admitted the parties' stipulated exhibits S1-S3 and Respondent's exhibit A. In lieu of making closing statements at the hearing on the sanctions, the parties submitted written statements on April 5, 2023.

II. FACTS AND RULE VIOLATIONS ESTABLISHED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The findings of fact regarding Respondent's rule violations are drawn from the undisputed material facts set forth in the Court's summary judgment order. Respondent was admitted to practice law in Colorado on December 4, 2006, under attorney registration number 38349.³ Respondent is thus subject to the Hearing Board's jurisdiction in this proceeding.⁴

Facts Established on Summary Judgment

Respondent's name as registered with the Office of Attorney Registration is Jennifer Reba Edwards, but Respondent's criminal court records list her name as Jennifer Reba Emmi a/k/a Jennifer Edwards. Jennifer Reba Emmi and Jennifer Reba Edwards are one and the same.⁵

² Although Dr. Jena Questen appeared via Zoom, the parties agreed to tender her written statement in lieu of her testimony due to her poor internet connection and limited time. The PDJ admitted Dr. Questen's written statement as Respondent's exhibit A.

³ See Stip. Fact 2.

⁴ C.R.C.P. 242.1(a)(1).

⁵ See also Stip. Facts 3, 5.

Respondent pleaded guilty to multiple felony counts and two misdemeanor counts in three separate criminal cases, and she was sentenced to a ten-year period of incarceration.⁶

On January 29, 2021, prosecutors filed a complaint and information against Respondent in Jefferson County District Court case number 21CR263, alleging six felony counts: Count 1 (solicitation to commit murder in the first degree); Count 2 (retaliation against a witness or victim); Count 3 (retaliation against a witness or victim); Count 4 (stalking); Count 5 (stalking); and Count 6 (stalking). The prosecution in case number 21CR263 moved to add two felony counts against Respondent: Count 7 (stalking) and Count 8 (solicitation to commit murder in the second degree). The motion to add Counts 7 and 8 includes the alleged factual basis for the two new counts.

On June 28, 2021, Respondent pleaded guilty and was convicted in Jefferson County District Court case number 21CR263 on Count 2 (retaliation against a witness or victim, C.R.S. § 18-8-706, a class-three felony); Count 7 (stalking, C.R.S. §§ 18-3-602(1)(b), (5), a class-four felony); and Count 8 (solicitation to commit murder in the second degree, C.R.S. § 18-3-103(1) and C.R.S. § 18-2-301, a class-three felony). On August 16, 2021, Respondent was sentenced to a ten-year period of imprisonment in the Colorado Department of Corrections for each felony conviction in case number 21CR263, with the sentences to run concurrently.

Also on June 28, 2021, Respondent pleaded guilty and was convicted in Jefferson County District Court case number 20CR181 on Count 2 (menacing, C.R.S. §§ 18-3-206(1)(a) and (b), a class-five felony); Counts 3 and 5 (child abuse—knowingly/reckless—no injury, C.R.S. §§ 18-6-401(1) and (7)(b)(1), second-degree misdemeanors); and Count 8 (second-degree assault—strangulation, C.R.S. §§ 18-3-203(1)(i) and (2)(a), a class-six felony). Respondent was sentenced to two years of imprisonment in the Colorado Department of Corrections in case number 20CR181, to be served concurrently with her sentence in case number 21CR263.

Moreover, on the same date, Respondent pleaded guilty and was convicted in Jefferson County District Court case number 20CR1954 on Count 3 (attempt to influence a public servant, C.R.S. § 18-8-306, a class-four felony) and Count 6 (violation of bail bond conditions, C.R.S. § 18-8-212(1), a class-six felony). On August 25, 2021, Respondent was sentenced to four years of imprisonment in the Colorado Department of Corrections in case number 20CR1954, to be served concurrently with her sentence in case number 21CR263.

Rule Violations Established on Summary Judgment

On summary judgment, the Court concluded as a matter of law that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 8.4(b), which provides it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. The Court noted that Respondent does not dispute the People's allegations that she pleaded guilty to and was convicted in Jefferson County District Court of felony and misdemeanor charges. The Court

⁶ See also Stip. Facts 7-8.

also noted that the People attached to their motion certified copies of the judgment of conviction in each case, conclusively establishing the convictions and proving Respondent's commission of the crimes for purposes of this proceeding.⁷ The Court thus found that Respondent committed the criminal acts that the People allege, establishing the first element of the People's claim. The Court also found that the criminal acts indisputably reflect adversely on Respondent's fitness as a lawyer and thus fall within the ambit of conduct prohibited by Colo. RPC 8.4(b).⁸

The Court rejected Respondent's arguments that the lawfulness or validity of the charges, pleas, or convictions in Respondent's criminal matters should preclude entry of summary judgment. The Court also reminded Respondent that it was rule-bound to conclude that a certified copy of the judgment of conviction "proves the lawyer's commission of that crime" for the purposes of a disciplinary proceeding.⁹ The Court thus concluded that Respondent engaged in criminal acts that reflect adversely on Respondent's fitness as a lawyer. The Court therefore concluded that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 8.4(b).

III. SANCTIONS

The American Bar Association *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* ("ABA Standards")¹⁰ and Colorado Supreme Court case law guide the imposition of sanctions for lawyer misconduct.¹¹ When imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, the Hearing Board must consider the duty the lawyer violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct. These three variables yield a presumptive sanction that the Hearing Board may then adjust based on aggravating and mitigating factors.

ABA Standard 3.0 – Duty, Mental State, and Injury

Duty. Respondent violated her duty to the public, including her duty to comply with the laws of the State of Colorado, by committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer in other respects.

Mental State. The elements of the crimes to which Respondent pleaded guilty establish that she acted knowingly or intentionally while committing the criminal conduct. As to the crimes of solicitation to commit murder in the second degree, attempt to influence a public servant, violation of bail bond conditions, and second-degree assault (strangulation),

⁷ See C.R.C.P. 242.42(d).

⁸ The Court cited Colo. RPC 8.4(b) cmt. 2 (stating that the rule prohibits "[o]ffenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice . . .").

⁹ C.R.C.P. 242.42(d).

¹⁰ Found in ABA *Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* (2d ed. 2019).

¹¹ See *In re Roose*, 69 P.3d 43, 46-47 (Colo. 2003).

Respondent acted intentionally. With regard to Respondent's convictions for menacing, stalking, and child abuse, Respondent acted knowingly, at a minimum.

Injury. We find significant injury here. Respondent seriously harmed her children emotionally by committing criminal acts in their presence, resulting in her convictions for child abuse. She harmed her attempted strangulation victim; an element of her conviction for that act includes application of "sufficient pressure to impede or restrict the breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying such pressure to the neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of the other person and thereby causes bodily injury."¹² Further, Respondent caused, at a minimum, potential injury by engaging in acts leading to her conviction for the crime of menacing, an element of which is the placing or attempted placement of another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. The Hearing Board also finds that Respondent's criminal acts harmed the legal system, as she violated court orders, including protection orders and bail bond conditions, and attempted to influence a public servant. These actions demonstrate Respondent's disregard for the law's dictates. Finally, we find Respondent's misconduct has brought significant disrepute to the legal profession.

ABA Standards 4.0-8.0 – Presumptive Sanction

The presumptive sanction for Respondent's violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(b) is disbarment under ABA *Standard* 5.11(a), which applies when a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, the intentional killing of another, or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses.

ABA Standard 9.0 – Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Aggravating factors include any considerations that justify an increase in the degree of the sanction to be imposed, while mitigating factors warrant a reduction in the severity of the sanction.¹³ As explained below, we apply four factors in aggravation, according average weight to three and substantial weight to one. We also apply five factors in mitigation, deeming two factors to carry average weight, two factors to be minimally mitigating, and one factor to carry substantial weight.

Aggravating Factors

Pattern of Misconduct – 9.22(c). Respondent was convicted of criminal conduct that began in 2020 and continued through 2021 in three different criminal cases. Despite intervention by the legal system, Respondent continued her criminal conduct, which we deem to be a pattern of misconduct. We thus apply this factor.

¹² C.R.S. § 18-3-203(1)(i).

¹³ See ABA *Standards* 9.21 and 9.31.

Multiple Offenses – 9.22(d): We apply this factor in aggravation given the many types of criminal offenses Respondent committed, including serious felonies, many of which involved some form of retaliation against or efforts to eliminate or intimidate her victims or accusers.

Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Misconduct – 9.22(g): We are deeply concerned that throughout this disciplinary proceeding Respondent has been unwilling or unable to acknowledge that her misconduct was wrong or that people, including her own children, were harmed by her misconduct, even while she serves a prison sentence for crimes to which she has pleaded guilty. Instead, she has steadfastly maintained that she is the victim. We thus apply this aggravating factor and accord it substantial weight.

Vulnerability of Victim – 9.22(h): Respondent's former husband and his girlfriend, whom Respondent identified as the family's former au pair, are the statutory victims of the felony offenses that Respondent committed. Respondent's minor children are the statutory victims of Respondent's conduct underlying her misdemeanor child abuse conviction. Without a doubt, these minor children were particularly vulnerable and have suffered significantly as a result Respondent's criminal acts committed in response to her marital crises.¹⁴ We thus apply this factor.

Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law – 9.22(i): The People urge us to apply this factor. While we recognize that Respondent had been a lawyer for more than thirteen years when the misconduct began, we decline in our discretion to apply this aggravating factor because Respondent's misconduct was not related to her law practice.

Illegal Conduct – 9.22(j): Though the People advance this aggravating factor for our consideration, we decline to apply it here out of concern that to do so would risk double-counting this factor against Respondent, first as sanctionable conduct and then as an aggravator.¹⁵

Mitigating Factors

Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record – 9.32(a): Respondent has no prior discipline. In our discretion, however, we accord this factor minimal weight because her conduct does not stem from her law practice.¹⁶

¹⁴ See *Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Thompson*, 786 A.2d 763, 773 (Md. 2001) (remarking that childhood is a time of life when a person may be most susceptible to psychological damage).

¹⁵ See *In re Ivy*, 374 P.3d 374, 384 (Alaska 2016) (cautioning against the risk of double-counting against a lawyer when an aggravating factor turns on the same facts as the sanction or as other aggravators); *In re Kamb*, 305 P.3d 1091 (Wash. 2013) (declining to apply the illegal conduct aggravator where the illegal conduct formed the basis of the disciplinary charge).

¹⁶ See *Fla. Bar v. Hall*, 49 So.3d 1254, 1263 (Fla. 2010) (disbarring a lawyer who engaged in felonious conduct unrelated to the lawyer's law practice notwithstanding the lawyer's absence of prior discipline since her admission to the bar in 1986).

Personal or Emotional Problems – 9.32(c). The People acknowledge that Respondent, when her misconduct began, experienced personal or emotional problems stemming from the decline of her marriage and her family life. These personal and emotional problems were magnified after Respondent lost access to her children. We also heard persuasive testimony from Crist, Respondent’s mother, who observed that Respondent struggled with her failing marriage and with poor health at the time she committed the criminal offenses to which she eventually pleaded guilty. Crist testified that she observed Respondent acting scared, upset, and temperamental. Respondent became “extremely emotional” after she could no longer communicate with her children, Crist said. We thus apply this factor.

Cooperative Attitude Toward Proceedings – 9.32(e). We credit Respondent for participating in this case despite the obstacles she credibly alleged arose from her incarceration, including delays in her mail service and limited access to her lawyer in this matter.¹⁷ We qualify this finding, however, by noting that Respondent has not taken any overt actions to cooperate with this disciplinary process. At the hearing, Respondent often evaded questions and failed to provide direct answers, although we attribute some of this behavior to Respondent’s unique situation—namely, being incarcerated and appearing remotely from prison, with counsel present but not at her side. Ultimately, we conclude that cooperating with disciplinary authorities is a lawyer’s duty to the profession, and Respondent achieved a bare minimum threshold of cooperation.

Character or Reputation – 9.32(g). Respondent practiced for many years as a well-known animal law lawyer. We credit her testimony that she was held in high regard for her work in a novel practice area, developing cutting-edge legal approaches in a wide variety of cases related to the treatment of animals. Murphy and Swearingen strongly supported Respondent’s testimony, describing for us the consequential work Respondent did during her career. We also credit Dr. Questen’s account of Respondent’s positive involvement in the local, business, and animal welfare communities.¹⁸ We apply this factor and give it significant weight.

Physical Disability – 9.32(h). Respondent asks that we apply this factor. We observed that Respondent’s current mobility is limited and she currently depends on a wheelchair. We also understand that Respondent’s deteriorating health has created significant physical limitations. But we lack evidence that any physical disability contributed to Respondent’s misconduct. We thus decline to apply this factor in mitigation.

¹⁷ Until late January 2023, Respondent remained incarcerated in the Colorado Department of Corrections at the Denver Women’s Correctional Facility in Colorado. Around January 19 or 20, 2023, Respondent was transferred to the Fluvanna Correction Center for Women in Virginia, where she is currently incarcerated. Stip. Facts 10-11.

¹⁸ See Ex. A.

Mental Disability or Chemical Dependency – 9.32(i):¹⁹ Though we are not mental health experts, Respondent's own testimony made obvious to us that the dissolution of her marriage, the loss of access to her children, and her subsequent incarceration have had a notable effect on her mental health and her ability to demonstrate reasoned, consistent, and balanced judgment. Unfortunately, Respondent offered no solid evidence demonstrating that she has engaged in any treatment for a mental health condition or that she even recognizes she may need treatment to address the trauma of all that happened during the relevant time periods. Thus, we decline to apply this mitigator.

Delay in Disciplinary Proceedings – 9.32(j): We find no appreciable delay in these proceedings due to any fault of the Court or the People. We decline to apply this factor.

Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions – 9.32(k): Respondent has been sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment for her criminal conviction. We thus apply this factor.

Remorse – 9.32(l): Respondent denies that she committed any misconduct, asserting that she is innocent of the charges and that her guilty pleas were not valid.²⁰ Thus, we cannot conclude that she takes any appreciable responsibility for her conduct or that she feels real remorse for her misconduct. Nor do we find that Respondent has shown genuine contrition for exhibiting such disrespect for the law or the effect that her criminal conduct had on the profession. We decline to apply this factor.

Analysis Under ABA Standards and Case Law

The Hearing Board observes the Colorado Supreme Court's directive to exercise discretion in imposing a sanction and to carefully apply aggravating and mitigating factors,²¹ mindful that "individual circumstances make extremely problematic any meaningful comparison of discipline ultimately imposed in different cases."²² Though prior cases can inform through

¹⁹ This factor may be applied when there is medical evidence that a respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; that the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and that the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely. See *ABA Standard 9.32(i)(1)-(4)*.

²⁰ Stip. Fact 9. The certified court records of the Jefferson County District Court show that Respondent remains convicted of the charges to which she entered guilty pleas on June 28, 2021. Stip. Fact 9.

²¹ See *In re Attorney F.*, 2012 CO 57, ¶ 20; see also *In re Fischer*, 89 P.3d 817, 822 (Colo. 2004) (finding that a hearing board had overemphasized the presumptive sanction and undervalued the importance of mitigating factors in determining the needs of the public).

²² *Attorney F.*, ¶ 20 (quoting *In re Rosen*, 198 P.3d 116, 121 (Colo. 2008)).

analogy, the Hearing Board is charged with determining the appropriate sanction for a lawyer's misconduct on a case-by-case basis.²³

The People press for disbarment. Respondent does not dispute that the presumptive sanction here calls for disbarment but argues that suspension is appropriate in light of the mitigating factors. She also contends that a suspension will give her "the opportunity for rehabilitation to try to rebuild her life and once again be a benefit to clients and the community" through her legal work.²⁴

Under the ABA *Standards* and case law, Respondent's conviction for solicitation to commit murder is analogous to attempted murder.²⁵ In other disciplinary matters, lawyers have been disbarred for committing murder or attempted murder. In *People v. Draizen*, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer convicted of second-degree murder.²⁶ Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.²⁷ In addition, this Court has disbarred lawyers who have been criminally convicted of murder and attempted murder.²⁸

In this case, Respondent pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, committing very serious crimes. We recognize that Respondent's emotional struggles from her family issues and her distress at losing access to her children likely played some role in her criminal conduct, but her personal and emotional problems unquestionably do not justify her acts. And though we find other factors that mitigate Respondent's conduct—notably, her legal career, during which she was a credit to the legal profession through her advocacy for animals and their caretakers—the aggravating factors in this case balance the scales, and we decline to exercise our discretion to deviate from the presumed sanction of disbarment here. Indeed, given Respondent's criminal conduct, we cannot conceive a scenario that would justify the deviation she requests. Disbarment is the most and only appropriate sanction, which we impose.

²³ *Id.* ¶ 15.

²⁴ Resp't's Hr'g Br. at 8.

²⁵ See ABA *Annotated Standards* at 253 ("When a lawyer conspires with another to commit a criminal offense or solicits another to do so, the lawyer can be disciplined under Standard 5.11(a)."); *In re Walker*, 713 S.E.2d 264, 265-67 (S.C. 2011) (approving a stipulation to disbarment for a lawyer's misconduct that included the lawyer's guilty plea to solicitation of a felony after the lawyer admitted to attempting to hire a "hit man" to murder another lawyer).

²⁶ 941 P.2d 280, 281 (Colo. 1997).

²⁷ See, e.g., *In re Farren*, 118 A.3d 217, 218 (D.C. 2015) (deeming the crime of attempted murder to be a crime of moral turpitude and disbarring the convicted lawyer); *In re Mendenhall*, 959 N.E.2d 254, 256 (Ind. 2012) (disbarring a lawyer convicted of attempted murder and other crimes, despite the presence of mitigating factors).

²⁸ See, e.g., *People v. Kintzele*, 409 P.3d 680, 683 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2017) (disbarring lawyer for conviction for attempted murder); *People v. Sims*, 190 P.3d 188, 190 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008) (disbarring a lawyer after her conviction for murder).

IV. CONCLUSION

By disregarding the criminal laws of the State of Colorado and committing several different types of serious criminal conduct, including solicitation to commit murder, Respondent has shown herself to be unfit to be a member of the legal profession. Because the primary purpose of the lawyer disciplinary system is to protect the public, we must disbar Respondent.

V. ORDER

The Hearing Board therefore **ORDERS**:

1. **JENNIFER REBA EDWARDS**, attorney registration number **38349**, will be **DISBARRED** from the practice of law in Colorado. The disbarment will take effect upon issuance of an "Order and Notice of Disbarment."²⁹
2. To the extent applicable, Respondent **MUST** promptly comply with C.R.C.P. 242.32(b)-(e), concerning winding up of affairs, notice to current clients, duties owed in litigation matters, and notice to other jurisdictions where she is licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law.
3. Within fourteen days of issuance of the "Order and Notice of Disbarment," Respondent **MUST** file an affidavit with the Court under C.R.C.P. 242.32(f), attesting to her compliance with C.R.C.P. 242.32. As provided in C.R.C.P. 242.41(b)(5), lists of pending matters, lists of clients, and copies of client notices under C.R.C.P. 242.32(f) must be marked as confidential attachments and filed as separate documents from the affidavit.
4. The parties **MUST** file any posthearing motions no later than **June 5, 2023**. Any response thereto **MUST** be filed within seven days.
5. The parties **MUST** file any application for stay pending appeal **no later than the date on which the notice of appeal is due**. Any response thereto **MUST** be filed within seven days.
6. Respondent **MUST** pay the costs of this proceeding. The People **MUST** submit a statement of costs no later than **June 5, 2023**. Any response challenging the reasonableness of those costs **MUST** be filed within seven days thereafter.

²⁹ In general, an order and notice of sanction will issue thirty-five days after a decision is entered under C.R.C.P. 242.31(a)(6). In some instances, the order and notice may issue later than the thirty-five days by operation of C.R.C.P. 242.35, C.R.C.P. 59, or other applicable rules.



DATED THIS 22nd DAY OF MAY, 2023.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Bryon M. Large", is written over a horizontal line.

BRYON M. LARGE
PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Maureen A. Cain", is written over a horizontal line.

MAUREEN A. CAIN
HEARING BOARD MEMBER

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Barbara Weil Laff", is written over a horizontal line.

BARBARA WEIL LAFF
HEARING BOARD MEMBER